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Abstract
Since the 1980s, Hizbollah has emerged as the guardian of Lebanon's
Shi'a and a stalking horse for Iran. Syria, though allied with Tehran, seeks
to manage Hizbollah's freedom of action in Lebanon and is eyed cautiously in Damascus. Hizbollah has managed to maintain independence
from these Syrian efforts because of both Lebanese Shi'a religious élan
and the protection given Hizbollah by its Shi'a allies in Iran.

Introduction
Syria is historically and geographically ill-defined, although an identifiable Syrian ethnicity can be traced to the Biblical era. Nonetheless, the
contemporary Syrian state deems Lebanon little more than an errant Syrian province, albeit one that has been at the economic heart of Syria since
Ottoman times.1 Syria's political objectives are to maintain authority over
the Lebanese state and to manipulate both Hizbollah ("Party of God") and
the larger Lebanese polity to Syrian advantage. On the other hand, Iran—
with an historic connection to the Shi'a of Lebanon—seeks ostensibly to
further the Shi'a Islamist revolution. Iran and Syria mutually desire to use
Lebanon and Hizbollah as an asset in their own confrontations with
Israel.
Beginning with the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war in 1975, Syria worked
to penetrate and influence terrorist organizations and militias operating
in Lebanon with the aim of furthering Syria's political domination. Syria
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has been unsuccessful in its efforts to penetrate and control Hizbollah,
due—in part—to Iran's interests in the Shi'a inhabitants of Lebanon. The
modus vivendi (understanding) that finally emerged was one of Syrian
tolerance for Hizbollah's relative independence in return for Hizbollah's
facilitation of larger Syrian interests regarding Lebanon and Israel.
Syria's support of Hizbollah is an element of the marriage of convenience
that characterizes the larger Iranian-Syrian entente. The changing nature
of Iran's relationship with Syria mirrors, to a certain extent, the relationship between Hizbollah's security apparatus and Syrian intelligence. The
genuine alliance between Hizbollah and Iran can be juxtaposed against
Syria's desire to control Hizbollah activity in Lebanon. Essentially, Syria
tolerates and supports Hizbollah's activities in Lebanon because Hizbollah furthers Syria's political and policy objectives. Syria's ability to attenuate the arms flow to Hizbollah is its primary source of influence. That
influence is limited, however, by Damascus's need to maintain good relations with Tehran.
Syrian backing for Hizbollah operations has been characterized by a
punctuated rhythm in the decades following Hizbollah's establishment.
Syrian support was greatest between the Iranian creation of Hizbollah in
July of 1982 through the Hizbollah operations aimed at driving the Multinational Forces out of Lebanon two years later. Following the withdrawal
of Multinational Forces in 1984, Syria attenuated its support for Hizbollah operations as it altered its intentions regarding Israel and Lebanon.
When Syria wants to intimidate non-Shi'a Lebanese or Israel, it provides
greater support for Hizbollah operations. Once those objectives are
achieved, Syria reduces its support for Hizbollah. When Syrian assistance
to Hizbollah is otherwise minimal, it nonetheless facilitates logistical support, in part, to maintain good relations with Tehran. The current Adra
facility near Damascus, for example, is a case in point. It is within Syrian
borders but acts as a Hizbollah arms depot and trans-shipment point, as
well as a Hizbollah training facility. Syria's physical control of the facility
allows it to attenuate the arms flow to Hizbollah in Lebanon. This nominal control, however, is undermined by the fact that the arms are financed
by Tehran. Therefore, Damascus's ability to exercise its authority over the
facility and Hizbollah is truncated, lest it incur Tehran's wrath.
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The Foundational Syrian Intelligence Apparatus and
Its Operations in Lebanon
While Syria managed to subsume its clan, tribal, and religious divisions
under an authoritarian and secular Ba'athist state by the 1960s,2 these
factional loyalties continue to persist in its intelligence services.3 Syrian
intelligence originated during the French Mandate (1923–1943) and was
referred to as the Deuxième Bureau until 1969.4 The modern Syrian intelligence services emerged in the 1970s under (then) Soviet tutelage. They
still reflect Soviet influence, albeit in a particularly Syrian political and
cultural context. The historic heart of Syria's praetorian state during the
regime of Hafez Assad (1971–2000) was a balanced triumvirate consisting of the General Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Amn al-'Amm), General Military Intelligence (Shu'bat al-Mukhabarat al-'Askariyya), and Air
Force Intelligence (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya).5 Air Force Intelligence is the smallest intelligence organ, but its role is significant in liaising with Syrian-sponsored terrorist organizations.6
Syria's foundational intelligence agencies are supported by derivative
agencies in a security network whose primary imperative is the protection
of Assad's (both Hafez's and Bashar's) regime. The primary external focus
of Syrian intelligence is on the polities of Lebanon. During the last quarter
of the twentieth century in Lebanon, Syria pioneered and perfected the
operational use of state-sponsored terrorism as a covert tool of state policy.7 Elements of Syrian Military and Air Force Intelligence, in their early
institutional iterations, created regularized procedures whereby Damascus would approve political targets and task a terrorist group operating
in Lebanon, but dominated by Syria (such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine General Command [PFLP-GC]) as external assets.
The PFLP-GC, in this example, would then carry out the operational particulars with Syrian intelligence support, thereby insulating the Syrian
government from direct culpability.8
The ability of Syrian intelligence organs to infiltrate organizations in Lebanon is facilitated by a border that is somewhat ambiguous because of the
reluctance of Damascus to completely demarcate the boundary or recognize Lebanese sovereignty.9 In essence, the border is merely an administrative division between eastern Lebanon and Syria proper, although
there are two major recognized crossing points: at Jusia between Baalbek,
Lebanon and Homs, Syria; and at Masnaa on the Beirut-to-Damascus
highway. Several dozen additional informal crossing points are used primarily by smugglers.10 Individual Syrian officers administering the post1976 occupation of Lebanon were often primarily concerned with per3
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sonal enrichment, and only secondarily concerned with either Syria's Lebanese interests or the confrontation with Israel.11 Syrian occupation
authorities operated what amounted to a tax-farming system in the Bekka
and allowed narcotics production to surge from regional to global significance while funneling hundreds of millions of dollars into the larger Syrian economy.12 In addition to profiting from other kinds of criminal
activity, Syria used Lebanese front men and Lebanese banks to launder
money procured from corruption, and to facilitate particular terrorist
operations.13 Since the nominal Syrian state lacked a private banking system, Damascus was quite dependent on the Lebanese banks for both normal economic transactions and for more nefarious Syrian activities.

Lebanese Militias as Syrian Instruments
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was founded in Beirut and has
traditionally maintained a substantial presence in Lebanon, along with
several large, although factionalized, militias wholly beholden to Damascus. The Bath'ist foreign policy of modern Syria effectively incorporated
part of the pan-Syrian ideology expressed decades earlier by the SSNP,
arguing that geographic Syria should include present-day Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan.14 The SSNP's significant links to many of the
region's political radicals facilitated enhanced operational flexibility of
Syrian intelligence interactions with terrorist organizations in Lebanon.15
The ability of Syrian intelligence to access the SSNP provided Syria's
organs with an additional entrée into some of the major Palestinian militias, which Syria sought to infiltrate in order to bolster the Syrian intelligence apparatus.
Syria has used the SSNP as a level to manipulate various factions and
militias in Lebanon, including Lebanon's Shi'a community. In 1986, for
example, Hafez Assad deployed the SSNP militias to rein in Hizbollah,
lest it threaten the continued viability of Shi'a Lebanese Resistance
Detachments (aka Amal al-Islamiyah, or AMAL, which also means
"hope" in Arabic), and thereby degrade Syrian influence over the Shi'a
population.16 Hizbollah's ability to extend its wasta, or influence, deep
into the Shi'a clans was in direct competition with Syria's effort to dominate the larger Lebanese polity. Assad used the SSNP to enhance his
authority in Lebanon, while avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran that
might have ensued had Syrian troops confronted Hizbollah directly. Syria
and Iran then negotiated a cease-fire and modus vivendi between AMAL
and Hizbollah, easing tensions until the T'iaf agreement ended the larger
civil war in 1989. Syria also desired access to the Palestinian camps,
whose extraterritoriality established by the Cairo Agreement was an
intrinsic affront to the authority of Damascus.17 In addition to the SSNP,
4

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/2
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.1</p>

Wege: Hizbollah–Syrian Intelligence Affairs: A Marriage of Convenience

Hizbollah–Syrian Intelligence Affairs: A Marriage of Convenience

organizations like the PFLP-GC furthered Syrian infiltration efforts.
Although long beholden to Syrian intelligence, the PFLP-GC nevertheless
shed its Marxist pretenses and embraced both Iran and Syria when
Tehran began to fund the organization.18 The result was a PFLP-GC with
some factions beholden to Iran and others more subservient to Damascus. The PFLP-GC became a Syrian tool, particularly in the Borj AlBaraineh camp in southern Beirut, while other PFLP-GC factions cooperated with Iranian intelligence.
Syrian influence in the Hizbollah-dominated Bekka was enhanced
through the presence of Syrian personnel in PFLP-GC facilities in Taalabaya, Koussaya (near Zahleh), and in the western Bekka area of Kamed
Al-Lawz. Assad likewise used what was originally an Iraqi Shi'a Islamist
Dawah organization to further its influence among Lebanon's Shi'a. Created by Baqr al-Sadr (a cousin of Musa Sadr) in 1958, Lebanon's alDawah (the Islamic Call) was formed in the late 1960s and officially dissolved itself in 1980 in response to Khomeini's admonitions concerning
Western-style party organization. There was little practical consequence,
as al-Dawah's members were subsumed into the larger Hizbollah movement. Those Dawah affiliates retaining less formal adherence to Dawah
ideology tended to follow Hussein Fadlallah. They became almost completely infiltrated by Syrian intelligence by the late 1990s, although they
continued training at Hizbollah camps until they created their own facilities in 1996.19 Additionally, Syria exercised its influence through compromised organizations. In so doing, it gained an independent modality with
which to enforce its authority over recalcitrant Lebanese players through
an autonomously operated system of detention centers in Beirut and Tripoli; in the Bekka towns of Anjar and Chtaura; and in prisons located at
Palmyra and Mezza (in Damascus).

Iran's Sway with Lebanon's Hizbollah
A cosmopolitan Lebanese state created under French auspices was
intended to protect Maronite co-religionists. Paris carved a ChristianArab state out of greater Syria in the environs of Mt. Lebanon.20 This
Christian-dominated Lebanon was forged with a confessional system
controlled by a Maronite-Sunni axis to the disadvantage of Lebanon's
Shi'a.21 Lebanon's Shi'a, historically affiliated with the Twelver Shi'a of
Iran, was relegated to third-class citizenship in their own country. The
confessional system stratified Lebanese political institutions and civil
society in ways that became increasingly untenable over time, ultimately
leading to civil war and Syrian intervention. This was followed by two
Israeli invasions aimed at settling accounts with the Palestinians. The
5
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initial Israeli invasion is noteworthy for the establishment of an Israelioccupied "security zone" roughly fifteen kilometers deep along Lebanon's
southern border. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in a more substantive
way, intent on liquidating the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
infrastructure in Lebanon. While the Shi'a of Lebanon's southern region
were in regular conflict with the Palestinians, the Israelis clashed with the
Shi'a as well, precipitating Iranian intervention. Among the Shi'a, the
1982 Israel-Lebanon war catalyzed the emergence of Islamic AMAL and
its coalition with the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and other Shi'a
factions in Lebanon's Bekka Valley.22 The Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem)
elements of Iran's Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami, or Revolutionary
Guards), in coordination with the Iranian Embassies in Beirut and
Damascus, deployed in eastern Bekka in July 1982.23 The Sepahe al-Quds
built on this AMAL coalition and, thus Hizbollah was born.24
The first iteration of Hizbollah included a security apparatus modeled on
the AMAL security service and, more generally, Fatah's Jihaz al-Razd.25
Hizbollah's initial operations were consummated using multiple organizational descriptors for this security apparatus.26 Hussein al-Khalil first
established Hizbollah's security apparatus in the Bekka during the summer of 1982, coordinating operations with AMAL before being formally
subordinated to Hizbollah under Hussein Musawi after 1984.27 The core
Hizbollah security apparatus functions were configured and nurtured by
elements of the Bekka's Pasdaran Quds.28 Hizbollah's initial creation in
the summer of 1982 under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
auspices resulted in necessarily limited operations aimed at the coalescence of Hizbollah's constituent entities.
The first military efforts carried out with these proto-Hizbollah fighters
were limited and intended primarily to gain control of territory in the
Bekka Valley. These coalescing Hizbollah fighters were primarily opposed
by scattered AMAL fighters and minor Bekka militias associated with
existing clans.29 The Israeli focus on the Palestinians was so intense that
they missed the significance of the "Party of God." These early Hizbollah
operations were organized with fighters drawn primarily from the
Hamadi and Musawi clans, using various organizational names. Between
1983 and about 1985, Sheikh al-Musawi became operational head of the
emergent security apparatus, with the Musawi and Hamadi clans remaining as core clans of the embryonic Hizbollah organization.30
Hizbollah's security apparatus, as it developed, reflected the configuration, almost in a geographic sense, of the principal Shi'a clans in each of
Lebanon's three distinct regions of Shi'a dominance, although the
regional organizations in the middle-1980s included elements of other
6
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clan-based criminal networks.31 The geographic regions themselves were
subdivided into sectors, creating a compartmentalized operational environment. Hizbollah developed multiple and overlapping security organs
derived from the original security apparatus. These subsidiary organs had
primary responsibility for maintaining Hizbollah's organizational integrity as the militia developed with changing security needs and relationships. Hizbollah's operational security arm is strictly separated from the
organization's political and military wings. That separation is more complete than the separation between most state political institutions and
security services. Consequently, Hizbollah's political wing's ability to
exercise administrative control over the military wing and its security
organs has always been problematic.
At the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1989, Hizbollah created a dual policy
in Lebanon. Hizbollah's military wing, the Islamic Resistance, continued
operations aimed at the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and provided armed protection for the Shi'a community in Lebanon. The logistical support for Hizbollah's Islamic Resistance was provided by Iran and
facilitated through Syria. In the second track, Hizbollah entered Lebanese
parliamentary politics, abiding by the political norms established with the
1989 Peace of Ti'af.32 Lebanese political stability increased, resulting in
an evolution of Hizbollah's security apparatus to include security functions supporting the organization's social, political, and military operations. With Hizbollah's emergence as a political party representing the
bulk of Lebanon's Shi'a, the security apparatus accrued some functions
analogous to an Interior Ministry's.33 Police functions became necessary
to maintain both the integrity of the party and Lebanon's Shi'a body politic in territories controlled by Hizbollah.
In the 1990s, local military operations focused on Israel and its occupation zone in the south. The security apparatus managed overall coordination and maintained organizational integrity, enhancing guerrilla
resistance until the Israelis were driven out in 2000.34 Syria maintained
an intelligence presence in every major Lebanese city, including a substantial one in the Ramlet al-Baida district of Beirut.35 Kan'an's replacement as head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, General Rustom
Ghazaleh, maintained a headquarters staff of about 100 Syrian military
intelligence personnel in the small eastern Bekka village of Anjar prior to
Syria's formal withdrawal of troops in 2005.
After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Hizbollah adopted a new approach
much more conducive to orderly governance which included giving tacit
approval for the Lebanese army to act against criminal gangs in Brital
(which had become a car-theft capital) and in the Hizbollah stronghold at
7
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Baalbek.36 The security apparatus thereby separated traditional police
functions from roles supporting military and covert operations. Following
the summer war in 2006, Hizbollah's role shifted more to one of deterring
Israeli incursion rather than resisting Israeli occupation. The incorporation of Hizbollah into the Lebanese polity as a formal partner in Lebanon's government, with ministerial responsibilities, concomitantly made
it a greater target for Syrian manipulation as Damascus sought to maintain control over the Lebanese state.

Iran and the Narrow Hizbollah-Syrian Entente
Syria's troop withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 was effectively reversed
because of the efforts of the former head of Syrian Military intelligence,
General Asif Shawkat, who was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the
armed forces in 2010. Yet Hizbollah's liaison with the Syrians was more
problematic than with Iran's Quds force and the Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS).37 Former Syrian President Hafez Assad facilitated
Pasdaran operations in the Bekka to immunize his troops in Lebanon
against Shi'a militants.38 This was important, with Assad supporting both
the Shi'a AMAL and the Shiite Hizbollah, even given the greater Alawite
affinity for the secularists of AMAL.39 The small Alawite community in
Lebanon was concentrated in Tripoli and Akkar in the north, and historically its members joined secular militias and parties, including Lebanon's
Ba'ath and Lebanese Community Party.
The major developments in the region since the summer war of 2006
have been the increasing role of Hizbollah in Syrian military doctrine and
the growing integration of Iran and Hizbollah into the Syrian command
and control apparatus. Hizbollah, while maintaining some features from
its origins as a liberation organization, has developed many characteristics of traditional military organizations. Iran has facilitated this development, supporting the creation of several brigade-style organizations, as
well as providing advanced infantry weapons and shoulder-fired surfaceto-air missiles. Post-war Iranian logistical support has resulted in a
Hizbollah rocket arsenal nearly three times its size prior to the summer
war, with a larger fraction of those rockets capable of carrying a more substantial payload with much more precise targeting. The number and quality of these rockets, and increasing confidence in Hizbollah's ability to use
them effectively, are acting as significant deterrents against an Israeli
invasion of Lebanon.
Hizbollah is also playing an operational role in the integration of some
channels of the joint Iranian-Syrian command apparatus.40 Syria and
8
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Iran maintain a common interest in monitoring events in Lebanon and
Israel. Consequently, an important element of the joint command apparatus has been the construction of electronic listening posts. Syria and Iran
agreed to build four such signals intelligence stations and constructed
them in the Golan Heights, the Al-Jazirah and Bab Al-Hawa' regions in
northern Syria, and the Abu Kamal region of northeastern Syria.41
While it would be a vast overstatement to imply that the Syrian and Iranian military commands are wholly integrated, it is nonetheless appropriate to acknowledge a significant level of cooperation in Lebanon and in
confrontations with Israel in that theater.42 Hizbollah's most notable role
in this integration has been in expanding the scope of communication and
signals intelligence. That scope ranges from support functions, such as
guarding approaches to the Mt. Sannine and Mt. Barukh radar stations
operated by Syria and Iran, to integrating Iranian intelligence personnel
into Hizbollah operational command posts that engage Israeli military
communications (as occurred during the 2006 summer war).

Conclusions
Syrian practice, since the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, has
been to infiltrate and manipulate terrorist organizations and militias of all
political stripes with the objective of turning them into Syrian assets. Such
assets further Syrian policy in its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Syria
has been unable however, to turn Hizbollah into a wholly owned asset,
due to both the Shi'a religious élan and the protection provided to Hizbollah by its alliance with Iran. Hizbollah has evolved into a component of
the Lebanese state, facilitating both Syrian and Iranian objectives while at
the same time maintaining its autonomy. The modus vivendi is Syria's
tolerance for Hizbollah independence and some Iranian role in Lebanon
in return for Hizbollah support of larger Syrian interests regarding Lebanon and Israel.
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Iranian Clergy and Institutions," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 (September 1994): 305. Tufayli was later Secretary General of Hizbollah but was ultimately expelled in 1998 over his opposition to Hizbollah's more moderate course.
He then created a "Revolution of the Hungry" (Thawrat al-Jiya) from his bastion in
the Brital region of the Bekka in 1999, but the movement failed, and Tufalyi was
marginalized as the century closed. See Rodger Shahanon, The Shi'a of Lebanon
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 123.
23 Aboul-Enein, Youssef and Rudolph Atallah. "Hizbollah: A Discussion of Its Early
Formation," Infantry 94, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 24. Iranian Ambassador to
Damascus Mohammed Hassan Skhtari was instrumental in building Hizbollah on
the ground in the Bekka.
24 Iran decided to foster an Islamist organization using the Pasdaran rather than
working with the more secularly oriented AMAL. See "Islamic Jihad Seen as ProIran," New York Times, April 19, 1983. The first Iranian volunteers were apparently sheltered at the Imam al-Mahdi school in Baalbek with an Iranian communications center in Baalbek's al-Khayyam hotel before the Guard acquired their
better-known bases in the valley. See Judith Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names
(New York: Touchstone Books, 1996), 282.
25 Prior to the rise of the Shi'a Islamists, Lebanese Shi'a tended to migrate into the
Lebanese Communist Party or Fatah (even though the Shi'a and Palestinians would
have strained relations in later years). The first exposure many Shi'a had in the
1970s to guerrilla training was under Fatah instructors.
26 Here Hizbollah followed the conventions of Fatah, wherein Fatah's Jihaz al-Razd
security entity operated using the Black September Organization moniker during
the 1970s.
27 Al-Khalil (who holds a degree in mathematics, oddly enough) became more of a
politician with less involvement in operations. However, like Imad Mugniyah, he
started out as a member of the Palestinian Fatah's Force 17 and commanded Fatah
military formations in Tyre during the 1978 Israeli invasion. In the 1982 Israeli
invasion, he fell back to Beirut with PLO forces; and after the Palestinian evacuation to Tunis, he migrated to Hizbollah, where he managed security for Hussein
Musawi. Al-Khalil would briefly be in charge of Hizbollah foreign operations and
then Hizbollah counterintelligence. He also maintained a parallel political role
with election to Hizbollah's Shura (decision-making) Council in 1985. See Magnus
Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 66. Khalil would later become chairman of Hizbollah's Politburo.
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28 The mission of Quds is to export the Shi'a Islamic revolution, and it is functionally
divided into geographically defined departments. The Lebanon/Palestine Department has been the most successful.
29 Although formed in response to the Israeli invasion of 1982, the IDF was preoccupied with the Palestinians and aware of little more than the arrival of the IRGC into
the Bekka.
30 See al-Hayat, 27 November 1989. Some Hamadi clan branches had roots around
the southern village of Sawaraneh as tobacco farmers. It claimed between two and
three hundred members, many of whom migrated to Beirut. See "Germans' Captors Linked to Hezbollah, Other Shiite Kidnappers," Associated Press, June 16,
1992. There are also Hamadi clan branches based in the Hermel plain between
Baalbek and Syria proper. Clan members have been prominent across the social
spectrum, from Sabry Hamadi, a former Speaker of Parliament, to Hamadi clan
elements prominent in the hashish industry. Across several decades, the Hamadis
and Assads acted as Shi'a dynasties, with alternating service as Parliament
Speaker.
31 In this organizational sense, they shared some characteristics with mid-20th century La Cosa Nostra families.
32 The Peace of Ta'if (the Wathiqat al-Mithaq al-Watani) was signed in the Saudi port
of Ta'if in October of 1989 under Saudi and Syrian tutelage. It made some adjustments to Lebanon's pre-civil war political system while maintaining the characteristic allocation of political power along confessional lines. After Ta'if, Hizbollah
compromised its earlier vision of an Islamic Republic outlined in the 1985 "Open
Letter to the Oppressed of the Earth" and in 2009 issued a manifesto that committed the organization to consensus democracy in Lebanon. In Parliamentary matters Hizbollah would ultimately cement alliances with Nabi Berri's AMAL and
Maronite Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.
33 Bryan Early, "Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State: Locating Hezbollah's
Place within Lebanon's State and Society," World Affairs 168 (Winter 2006). A
useful approach in understanding this phenomena is found in Trujillo and Jackson's "Identifying and Exploiting Group Learning Patterns for Counterterrorism"
in Chen Hsinchun, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke, and Boaz Ganor, eds.,
Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland
Security (New York: Springer Books, 2008), 175–195. Trujillo and Jackson identify
a four-stage process of acquisition, distribution, interpretation, and storage that
they use to model terrorist organizational learning.
34 This separation of military and intelligence functions was found to be operationally
deficient during the 2006 Israeli-Hizbollah war. Consequently, leaders of Hizbollah military districts now are responsible for both intelligence and counterintelligence in their districts as part of their overall military responsibilities.
35 "Syria closes its intelligence base in Beirut," Irish Times, March 16, 2005, available
at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-24780295.html.
36 Marlin Dick, "Hizbollah's Domestic Growing Pains," Middle East Report Online,
September 13, 2010, available at: http://merip.org/mero/mero091310.
37 The main Syrian intelligence facility was at the western entrance to the town.
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38 Syria supported Iran in the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq Gulf war. The Iranian dispatch of
Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon implicitly supported the Syrians while Israel
savaged Lebanon. This policy was continued by Bashar Assad as President of Syria
after the death of his father Hafez Assad in 2000.
39 Alawites are regarded as "Nusairis" by many Sunnis after the sect's founder, Abu
Shuaib Muhammed Ibn Nusair an-Numairi (d. 868). Syrian Alawites are likewise
divided into roughly four tribal groupings: the Haddadun, Khayyatun, Kalbiyyah,
and Matawirah, with the Assads deriving from the Numilatiyya wing of the
Matawirahs. See Mahmude A. Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New
Dominant Political Force," Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 2 (April 1984): 133–135.
It should be mentioned that relations among the Shi'a, Pasdaran, and Syrian security services were complex and changing. Syria actively assisted Hizbollah operations prior to the Multinational Forces withdrawal in 1984. Thereafter the
relationship was more problematic, although Syria always collected a healthy share
of revenue from the Bekka's drug-trafficking operations. With its abundant ironies
and anomalies, the drug trade nonetheless provided both a steady source of income
and a model of cooperation for all concerned. Apparently, a fair amount of the heroin was exported through Beirut international airport, while the hashish was
shipped primarily through the port of al-Mina near Tripoli. See Ranstorp,
Hizb'allah in Lebanon, 71. Shi'a clans in the Bekka involved with both drug smuggling and Hizbollah included Hamiya from Taraiya village west of Baalbek, Tles
and Mazloum from Brital town, and al-Masri from Hawr Ta'ala. See Benjamin
Feinberg, Sarah Marek, and Jan Snaidauf, unpublished paper, "Hizbullah and Its
Worldwide Crime/Terror Infrastructure," December 20, 2005.
40 In November 2005, Syria and Iran signed a joint Strategic Defense Cooperation
Agreement that included a signals intelligence (SIGINT) codicil.
41 "Iran and Syria advance SIGINT co-operation," Jane's Defense Weekly, July 10,
2006.
42 The abovementioned command center at Syrian General Staff Headquarters in
Damascus was apparently established to coordinate target packages for missile
assets deployed for use against Israel in any future conflict. The joint SyrianIranian facility included liaison with Hizbollah.
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